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ABSTRACT 
 
Pizza deliverers at two stores received turn-signal policy statements with two paychecks in an 
AB1B2 multiple baseline design. At Store A turn-signal use rose from a baseline mean of 70% 
to 78% after the first policy statement and to 84% after the second policy statement.  At Store B 
turn-signal use rose from a baseline mean of 46% to 51% after the first policy statement and to 
59% after the second policy statement. Concurrent observations of safety-belt use showed 
decreases from 78% to 65% at Store A and 74% to 59% at Store B after the first policy 
statement. 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 
 
A policy statement issued by a company specifies expected behaviors 
on the part of an employee. As an antecedent it prompts the 
individual to engage in these behaviors. Some employees may have 
experience with the consequences of non-compliance with a company 
policy. These could have been managerial comments, disciplinary 
action, or loss of job. For these employees, the policy statement also 
serves as a discriminative stimulus for compliance. 
 
Field observations suggest that governmental attempts to increase 
safe driving behaviors through laws have been successful. For example, 
safety-belt use increased dramatically after states passed a safetybelt 
use law (Zeigler, 1986; Campbell, Stewart, & Campbell, 1988). 
However, after an extensive review of the literature, no time series 
data could be found on the behavioral impact of a safety policy used 
within the context of a work setting. The present study reports such 
data on a company policy that required the use of vehicle turn signals. 
 
Many companies have safe-driving policies in place for corporate owned 
vehicles, but few have policies in place for privately-owned 
vehicles. Pizza deliverers, for example, are usually required to use 
their own vehicles, and safe driving behaviors are rarely mandated by 
their employing corporation. However, these employees are a population, 
because of their age, who are more prone to at-risk driving and 
vehicle crashes. At the time of this study, the target population (i.e., 
pizza deliverers) worked for a franchise corporation that promised fast 
delivery and rewarded rapid deliveries by paying employees a commission 
per each pizza delivered. Therefore, a policy statement from 
the company that prompted safety and implied negative consequences 
of at-risk driving was unique and salient. 
 
 
COUNTERCONTROL 
 
Recent studies of the driving practices of pizza deliverers have 
shown that when one safety-related behavior was targeted, the frequency 
of other safety-related behaviors changed significantly (Ludwig 
& Geller, 1991, 1997, in press; Ludwig, Geller, & Clarke, 1999). 
When the intervention process involved the employees in designing 
and implementing the procedures, response generalization (Kazdin, 
1973; Martin & Pear, 1996) occurred. In other words, the nontargeted 
safety-related behavior(s) increased concomitant with increases in the 
frequency of the target behavior. However, when the intervention 
process was mandated from management with minimal employee participation, 
the occurrence of nontargeted safety-related behaviors actually 
decreased (Ludwig & Geller, 1997). 
 
The occurrence of undesired behaviors following a mandated intervention 
has been referred to as countercontrol (Miller, 1991; Skinner, 
1953). Mawhinney (1999), for example, presents data, which appear 
later in this issue, of some telemarketers who decreased their number 
of phone calls in response to a mandated quota. Another applied 
example of countercontrol was observed by Geller, Casali, and Johnson 
(1980) who found that as safety-belt inducements systems (i.e., 
light, buzzer, and/or ignition interlock) became more intrusive (e.g., 
louder or longer), individuals were more likely to defeat the system by 
either sitting on a connected safety belt or disconnecting the system. 
Alternatively, individuals may engage in other undesirable behaviors 
not targeted by the intervention in order to avoid the aversive nature of 
the external control (Balsom & Bondy, 1983). This was demonstrated 
by Ludwig and Geller (1997) whereby some pizza deliverers received 
assigned goals and a mandated intervention. 
 
The present study evaluated the impact of a company mandate to 
increase the use of turn signals by pizza deliverers. Both turn-signal 
and safety-belt use were observed systematically using a multiple 
baseline design across two pizza delivery stores. 
 
 
METHOD 
 
 
Participants and Settings 
 
Pizza deliverers at two pizza stores (n = 36 at Store A; n = 24 at 
Store B) were observed unobtrusively when they departed for and 
arrived from their deliveries. Both franchises were from the same 
national corporation. The stores were located in adjacent towns (pop. 
30,000 and 40,000) in southwest Virginia. Store A was the only establishment 
that used a parking lot with two exits onto a four-lane road. 
Store B shared a parking lot with one other business that had two exits 
leading to different two-lane roads. The parking lots from both stores 
were connected to roads posting a 35 mph speed limit. Store A was 
within one mile of a state university serving 25,000 students. Deliverers 
were paid on commission (per total pizzas sold), which averaged 
approximately $.75 per delivery plus gratuity. 
 
Behavioral observations of turn-signal and safety-belt use took 
place during peak business hours (i.e., 5:00-8:00 pm). Turn-signal use 
was recorded by observing the right and left-turn signal blinkers on 
the lower front and rear of the vehicle. Safety-belt use was recorded by 
observing the position of the shoulder belt for the driver’s seat. No 
vehicles had automatic shoulder belts. 
 
Both turn-signal and safety-belt use were recorded using a simple 
‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ coding. Additionally, license plate numbers were collected 
during each observation. Data were collected by trained observers 
blind to the scheduling and assignment of the intervention conditions. 
Located in hidden positions overlooking the parking area of 
each pizza store, observers collected data using a behavioral checklist 
format applied extensively for these types of vehicle observations 
(Ludwig & Geller, 1991, 1997). Approximately 1/3 of the observation 
sessions were staffed by two research assistants who recorded data 
independently, thus enabling assessment of interobserver agreement. 
 
 
Experimental Design 
 
An AB1B2 multiple baseline design across two stores was used. 
After 8 weeks of baseline observations, all employees at Store A 
received the following turn-signal policy statement in their paychecks 
on pink paper: ‘‘It is the policy of (name of franchise) that all drivers 
use their turn signal at every intersection when making a delivery.’’ On 
a Friday, the paychecks were put in boxes designated for each pizza 
deliverer and picked up at their discretion (usually the same day). The 
same policy statement appeared in employees’ next paychecks available 
two weeks later, also on Friday. No further policy statements were 
distributed with paychecks after this point. 
 
Two weeks after Store A employees received their first policy statement, 
employees at Store B received their first turn-signal policy 
statement in their Friday paycheck. The Store B employees received a 
second statement in their subsequent Friday paycheck two weeks later. 
Follow-up observations did not continue after Week 14 due to high 
turnover of employees at both stores which corresponded to the winter 
break at two nearby universities. 
 
Three weeks after follow-up data collection concluded at both 
stores, a brief survey was distributed to the pizza deliverers’ boxes. 
This manipulation check asked if they had received a pink sheet of 
paper with their paychecks, and, if so, what did it say. Deliverers were 
instructed to turn the survey back to a centrally located box. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
A total of 5711 vehicle observations were conducted over a 
13-week period on the 60 different pizza deliverers who were observed 
within each phase of the study. Data from an additional 57 
deliverers were not used because they were not observed during all of 
the phases. A total of 1664 turn-signal observations were conducted at 
Store A and 1354 at Store B. A total of 1659 safety-belt observations 
were conducted at Store A and 1034 at Store B. An average of 34.5 
(ranging from 9 to 72) turn-signal observations and 32.6 (ranging 
from 9 to 65) safety-belt observations occurred in a single observation 
session. Data collection sessions that yielded less than 9 observations 
were not included in the data analysis because this created additional 
variability in the time-series analysis. 
 
Interobserver agreement percentages were calculated on 36% of the 
observation sessions by dividing the total number of observations 
agreed upon for a particular data category by the total number of 
agreements and disagreements, and multiplying the result by 100. 
Interobserver agreement averaged 92.4% for belt use (ranging from 
79.8% to 96.6%) and 92.6% for turn signal use (ranging from 80.1% 
to 98.3%). 
 
Figure 1 depicts daily percentages of turn-signal use by pizza deliverers 
at the two stores. The average daily turn-signal use was determined 
by calculating the mean percentage for each day across all 
deliverers observed that day. The average for each experimental phase 
represents the average of all daily means during that phase. At Store 
A, mean turn-signal use was 70% (ranging from 36% to 93% per 
session) during 1014 observations over a seven-week baseline period, 
78% (ranging from 61% to 87%) during 382 observations in the twoweek 
period between the first and second policy statement, and 84% 
(ranging from 76% to 91%) during the 268 observations conducted in 
a four-week period after the second policy statement. 
 
At Store B, mean turn signal use was 46% (ranging from 4% to 67% 
per session) during 1072 baseline observations over a nine-week period, 
51% (ranging from 45% to 56%) during 380 observations in the 
two-week period between the first and second policy statement, and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59% (ranging from 47% to 71%) during the 302 observations conducted 
in the two-week period following the final policy statement. 
 
Figure 2 depicts the daily percentages of safety-belt use by pizza 
deliverers at the two stores. The average daily and phase safety-belt 
use percentages were calculated in the same way as the means for 
turn-signal use. At Store A, mean safety-belt use was 78% (ranging 
from 41% to 96% per session) during 1010 observations over a seven week 
baseline period, 65% (ranging from 47% to 77%) during 366 
observations in the two-week period between the first and second 
 
 
 
 
policy statement, and 79% (ranging from 59% to 98%) during the 253 
observations conducted in the four-week period following the final 
policy statement. 
 
At Store B, mean safety-belt use was 74% (ranging from 48% to 
100% per session) during 1051 observations over a nine-week baseline 
period, 59% (ranging from 48% to 65%) during 159 observations 
in the two-week period between the first and second policy statement, 
and 70% (ranging from 68% to 83%) during the 94 observations 
conducted in the two-week period following the final policy statement. 
 
All 60 deliverers whose data were analyzed in this study received 
the two paychecks with the policy statements. No information was 
available on precisely when each deliverer picked up their paycheck 
and the policy statement. However, interviews with the managers of 
the stores indicated that over 90% of their employees pick up their 
paychecks the night they are issued or early the next day. This is 
logical since most employees were college students in need of the 
extra cash. At the end of the study ten employees at each store completed 
the brief manipulation check. Each of these individuals remembered 
the ‘‘pink slip’’ and mentioned that it was about turn-signal use. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
At both stores, turn-signal use increased marginally over the two 
administrations of a turn-signal use policy. Small but consistent increases 
in turn-signal use after the first policy statement were followed 
by further increases after the second policy statement. It is possible a 
ceiling effect limited a beneficial change in turn-signal use at Store A 
(since usage was already 70% during baseline), but a similar small 
impact was found at Store B where baseline usage was only 46%. The 
lack of long-term follow-up observations made it impossible to determine 
if the modest increases in turn-signal use associated with the 
policy statements showed any maintenance. However, because there 
were no programmed cues associated with policy compliance, it is 
likely that additional policy statements would be needed to maintain 
an improvement in the target behavior, and perhaps lead to further 
stepwise increases. 
 
Concurrent measures of safety-belt use showed prominent reductions 
after the first turn-signal policy at both stores. These decreases in 
belt use reversed back to the baseline levels after the second policy 
statement. Thus, while some pizza deliverers increased their turn-signal 
use, perhaps to avoid undesirable consequences of disobeying the 
new policy, they also decreased their practice of another safe-driving 
behavior, at least temporarily. 
 
The transient undesirable change in a nontarget behavior seems 
related to countercontrol (Skinner, 1953). In this case, these results 
suggest that the policy mandate, printed on a pink slip (commonly 
used for dismissal notices), was aversive and reflected top-down control. 
Exhibiting countercontrol by disregarding this policy statement 
would risk discipline, including removal from the job. However, the 
deliverer could exhibit countercontrol in another non-targeted behavior 
that is functionally related to the targeted behavior in some way 
(Balsom & Bondy, 1983). This is a possible explanation for the decrease 
in safety-belt use that occurred immediately after the delivery 
of the first turn-signal policy statements at each store. Both turn signal 
and safety-belt use are functionally related to safe driving. Some deliverers 
may have decided not to buckle-up in order to counteract the 
aversive nature of the external mandate on turn-signal use. 
 
A risk-compensation notion (Piltzman, 1975; Wilde, 1994) might 
also be used to explain these results. This theory proposes that 
people’s levels of risk are relatively constant, and when they do something 
that decreases their perception of risk, they perform other behaviors 
that increase this risk. Thus, it is possible that some deliverers felt 
more safe when using their turn signal and thus perceived less need to 
buckle-up. This would not explain, however, the transient nature of 
this effect, unless repeated use of a turn signal leads to a reduction in 
the perceived safety associated with initial performance of this behavior. 
Previous studies using this population have shown increases in 
untargeted safety behaviors that have not been associated with effects 
that resemble risk compensation (Ludwig & Geller, 1991, 1997, in 
press). Therefore, we are skeptical that risk compensation occurred in 
this study. 
 
Although the theoretical implications of our findings are interesting, 
this study does have some obvious limitations. Follow-up investigation 
is clearly warranted. For example, we would have liked to 
observe greater increases in turn-signal use after the policy statements. 
Perhaps a more strongly worded policy statement that specified undesirable 
consequences for non-compliance (e.g., ‘‘suspension or dismissal 
from work’’) would have lead to greater increases in turn-signal 
use. To further increase the impact of the policy intervention, employees 
could be required to sign a copy of the policy to confirm their 
knowledge of the new rule. At any rate, the apparent undesirable 
impact of a policy intervention on a nontargeted behavior is provocative, 
and calls for a more ecological approach to intervention evaluation 
(Geller, 1987; Willems, 1974) and an analysis of ‘‘undesired side 
effects’’ (Geller, 1991; Schwartz & Baer, 1991). 
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